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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20 (2003).
LAW: An applicant for disability benefits under the Social Security
Act cannot qualify as disabled if he can perform his previous job,
even if that job is disappearing from the economy.
FACTS: The Social Security Act provides benefits for those who
have a "disability." To qualify as disabled, a person must be
impaired to the extent that he is unable to do his previous work or
any other "substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy." Pauline Thomas, who had previously worked as an
elevator operator, applied for disability benefits. In an administrative
hearing, she was denied benefits because her impairments did not
prevent her from performing her previous work. Although Thomas
argued that her job had largely disappeared from the national
economy, the administrative law judge did not find the disappearance
of Thomas' previous job to be relevant. The ruling was affirmed by
the district court but reversed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
ANALYSIS: The Court read the statute as creating two separate
requirements for disability; an applicant must be unable to do his
previous work and unable to find any substantial work which exists
in the national economy. While, by the terms of the statute,
"substantial gainful work" must exist in the national economy, it is
not clear whether "previous work" must also exist in the national
economy. However, the Social Security Administration (SSA),
through its regulations, has interpreted the statute to reject such a
requirement. The five-step process promulgated by the agency,
defers the inquiry into the state of jobs in the national economy until
the last step, at which point many applicants have already been
eliminated. This construction is to be given deference under the
Chevron doctrine.
The Third Circuit's interpretation of the statute was criticized by
the Court for ignoring canons of grammatical construction which
indicate that the qualifying phrase "which exists in the national
economy" should only apply to "substantial gainful work." Likewise,
the Court refuted the Third Circuit's concern that a strict reading
could lead to absurd results. The Court reasoned that consideration
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of an applicant's previous employment may function as a "proxy" for
an analysis of employment existing throughout the economy
regardless of whether a previous job exists in the economy; such an
interpretation allows the SSA to avoid the burden of analyzing
applications individually. Although the agency's interpretation may
have imperfect applications in certain circumstances, it is ultimately a
reasonable interpretation.
HOLDING: The decision of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals is
reversed.
IMPACT: Applicants for disability benefits will not prevail if they
can perform a previously held job, regardless of whether that job is
available in the current national economy.
Cheney v. District Court, 124 S. Ct. 2576 (2004).
LAW: The government need not assert executive privilege before
courts can consider its separation of powers argument in a writ of
mandamus.
FACTS: President Bush created the National Energy Policy
Development Group (Group) as a means of getting advice on matters
of energy policy. The Group, which consisted of several federal
agency members, was chaired by Vice President Cheney, who had
the authority to include outside federal officers when appropriate.
After five months had passed, the Group issued a final report and
disbanded.
Following the report, Judicial Watch and the Sierra Club filed
actions against the Group, claiming that it had not complied with the
disclosure requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act
(FACA). FACA, which imposes open-meeting and disclosure
requirements, applies to groups that advise the President, but it does
not apply to any committee composed entirely of Federal
Government employees. While it is agreed that the President only
appointed officials from the federal government, Judicial Watch and
the Sierra Club contend that private individuals participated in non-
public meetings, acting as defacto members of the Group.
Although the district court dismissed some of the actions, it held
that the FACA could be enforced against the Vice President and
24-2
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government actors under the Mandamus Act, and against agency
members under the APA. The court also permitted a limited amount
of discovery in order to allow for a determination of whether there
were de facto members in the Group. The government sought a writ
of mandamus, but the Court of Appeals denied the petition, because
there were alternative remedies available, and the government could
protect its rights by asserting executive privilege in the district court
rather than obtaining a writ of mandamus. Moreover, the court
placed a burden on the government to object to discovery orders and
assert executive privilege with particularity.
ANALYSIS: The government's mandamus petition was not
untimely. While Judicial Watch and the Sierra Club argued that the
petition should be dismissed, they cite Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 4(a), which applies not to mandamus petitions, but to
notices of appeal. Likewise, the government is not barred by latches,
as the government actively pursued its rights.
The Court held that mandamus could be issued in this case.
Although mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, it would be proper
to issue it in this case. Courts may issue mandamus to restrain lower
courts that might endanger the executive's ability to perform its
functions by endangering the separation of powers. Moreover, the
government does not have to assert executive privilege in order to
object. Nixon does not apply; whereas the executive's confidentiality
is of paramount importance in a civil case, the need to uncover
evidence in a criminal case outweighs concerns of privilege. In
addition, civil litigation contains fewer checks than the criminal
justice system. Whereas a criminal prosecutor will exercise
discretion in bringing criminal charges, checks against frivolous civil
litigation are inadequate to protect against the filing of meritless
claims against the executive. The Court also noted that the discovery
requests in Cheney were broad, thereby threatening the integrity of
government confidentiality.
Finally, the Court refused to order the court of appeals to issue a
writ of mandamus. Discretion to issue the writ is given to the court
that is petitioned, and the Court of Appeals did not abuse its
discretion in failing to grant a writ to the government. The Court
thereby remanded the matter to the court of appeals, allowing it to
address the parties' arguments.
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HOLDING: The holding of the court of appeals is vacated, and the
case is remanded.
IMPACT: The executive is protected from requests for discovery in
civil actions, and is not required to make an affirmative showing of
privilege before requesting mandamus relief.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Mengistu v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1044 (7th Cir. 2004).
LAW: The Chenery doctrine precludes an administrative agency
from defending its action on a ground that is not stated or discernible
in the initial decision. Moreover, an agency decision must create a
"rational bridge" between factual findings and the agency's
conclusion in order to survive review.
FACTS: Thomas Mengistu, an Ethiopian whose ethnic background
is Eritrean, came to the United States on a student visa in 1989. His
visa expired in 1991, and the immigration service began deportation
proceedings against him in 1992. Mengistu applied for asylum, but
the judge denied the application and ordered deportation. Mengistu
appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) in 1993; the
Board affirmed the order in 2000.
After the order, Mengistu made a motion to reopen the case on
the basis of changed conditions. War broke out between Ethiopia
and Eritrea in 1998, and Ethiopia began to persecute its Eritrean
minority. Mengistu argued that his life or freedom would be
threatened if he were required to return to Ethiopia. However, the
war ended in December of 2000, and the Board denied his motion.
In its denial, the Board stated that, since the motion had been filed,
Ethiopia had begun to withdraw troops, and the United Nations had
deployed a peacekeeping mission.
ANALYSIS: The court noted that, if the Board had argued that
Mengistu's failure to respond to the immigration service undermined
his ability to carry the burden required to reopen a deportation
proceeding, the court might have deferred to the Board's
discretionary power. However, the cessation of war was the only
ground cited by the Board in its decision, and the Chenery doctrine
precludes an administrative agency from defending its actions on a
basis that was not discernible in the initial agency decision.
Moreover, Mengistu's failure to reply was not a compelling ground
for the agency's denial of his motion, so the court could not conclude
that this was harmless error. The court noted that Mengistu's silence
may have indicated that Mengistu found it unnecessary to support his
contention that there was persecution of Eritreans in Ethiopia, as the
Board's decision did not indicate that persecution had ended.
The Board's decision, which merely stated that Ethiopia was
withdrawing its troops, and the United Nations had deployed
peacekeepers, was held to be insufficient by the court. The opinion
did not build a "rational bridge" between these underlying facts and
the agency's conclusion that Mengistu did not require asylum.
Persecution of Ethiopia's Eritrean minority could conceivably persist
even after the war is over, and the Board made no attempt to address
the question of persecution, or shift the burden of proof to Mengistu.
The court also noted that neither Ethiopia nor Eritrea would issue
Mengistu a passport, and that several reports indicated that
persecution of Eritreans has continued. However, the court
concluded that questions relating to the substance of Mengistu's
asylum claim should be considered on remand.
HOLDING: The decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals is
vacated, and the matter is remanded to the Board.
IMPACT: The Board of Immigration Appeals must reconsider
Mengistu's motion and, in its decision, must explicitly connect its
findings to its conclusions.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, TENTH CIRCUIT
Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir.
2004).
LAW: The national do-not-call registry is a valid commercial speech
regulation which does not violate the First Amendment. Moreover,
the Federal Communications Commission's "established business
relationship" exception is not arbitrary and capricious, and the
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Federal Trade Commission has the authority to enact its do-not-call
rules.
FACTS: The do-not-call registry is the result of a decade-long effort
to protect consumer privacy and reduce the risk of telemarketing
abuse. Congress enacted the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of
1991 (TCPA), finding that consumers considered unsolicited
telemarketing to be an invasion of privacy. Additionally, Congress
found that commercial calls posed a larger threat to the public
interest than political or charitable calls. In the TCPA, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) was granted the authority to
establish a database of consumers who found telemarketing to be
intrusive. In 1994, Congress enacted the Telemarketing and
Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act (Telemarketing Act),
which authorized the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to prohibit
telemarketing that consumers would find coercive.
The FCC and FTC first attempted to implement the TCPA and
Telemarketing Act by creating company-specific lists. Telemarketers
were required to maintain lists of consumers who had asked that
particular seller not to call them, and these requests had to be obeyed.
However, this initial effort was ineffective; agencies credited this
failure in large part to the burden imposed on consumers, who would
have to contact multiple telemarketers in order to maintain their
privacy, and the failure of telemarketers to honor consumers'
requests. While the agencies kept these rules available as an option
for consumers, they decided to create the do-not-call registry as an
additional means of protecting consumers' rights.
In 2003, the FCC and FTC, acting in concert, created the national
do-not-call registry. The registry contains the phone numbers of
individuals who have indicated that they do not want to receive
unsolicited phone calls. Commercial telemarketers, but not callers
who are making charitable or political fundraising calls, are
prohibited from calling numbers on the registry absent an express
business relationship with the consumer or the consumer's express
written permission.
The court consolidated four challenges to the do-not-call registry
in Mainstream Marketing. These included First Amendment
challenges to the list itself and to its registry fees, a dispute over the
validity of the FCC's "established business relationship" exception,
and a challenge to the FTC's authority to enact do-not-call
regulations. The Tenth Circuit found that the telemarketers'
challenges lacked merit, and upheld the agencies' do-not-call
regulations.
ANALYSIS: The do-not-call registry was held to be a valid
commercial speech regulation under the Central Hudson test - there
is a substantial government interest in curbing unsolicited calls, the
regulation directly advances that interest, and the registry is narrowly
tailored to achieve the result, as it only restricts calls that are aimed at
unwilling listeners. Likewise, requiring telemarketers to pay a small
annual fee to access the registry is constitutional, as these fees merely
offset expenses incident to the administration and enforcement of the
program. Thus, the regulation survived a First Amendment
challenge.
The court rejected the argument that the FCC's exception for
companies which have an established business relationship with
customers is arbitrary and capricious in violation of the
Administrative Procedure Act. The FCC considered telemarketers'
concerns that the exception would have an anti-competitive effect,
asking parties to address these issues in its notice of rulemaking. The
FCC considered, but ultimately rejected, proposed rules that would
lessen the potential anti-competitive effect. Moreover, in rejecting
the alternative proposals, the FCC explained its reasoning. If the
FCC restricted the exception so that all telecommunications
companies were unable to call customers, companies would lack the
flexibility to discuss new services or products; such a restriction
would not be in the public interest. Other proposals were criticized
as failing to protect consumers' privacy rights. Finally, the FCC
cited factors which limited the anti-competitive effect of the
regulation: equal access to customers who were not on the registry,
the ability of individual customers to override the exception, and the
availability of other means of marketing services. The court saw the
FCC's conclusion as a reasoned policy decision which should be
deferred to, not an arbitrary and capricious exercise of the agency's
will.
The court also concluded that the FTC had the statutory authority
to promulgate do-not-call regulations. First, the court noted that the
FTC's interpretation of the Telemarketing Act was a reasonable
construction of the statute, and was therefore entitled to deference
under the Chevron doctrine. In addition, the court noted that,
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subsequent to the enactment of the Telemarketing Act, Congress
acted in a manner that was concordant with the FTC's understanding.
Congress directed the FCC and FTC to make their do-not-call rules
consistent, and also authorized the FTC to collect registry fees in
conjunction with the do-not-call registry. Moreover, Congress
ratified the FTC's authority, further affirming the agency's authority
to regulate.
HOLDING: The district court's judgment is reversed.
IMPACT: The FCC and FTC may continue to regulate
telemarketing using the national do-not-call registry.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 297
F. Supp. 2d 74 (D.D.C. 2003).
LAW: Agency rules narrowing the scope of general permits do not
constitute a "final" action which the court has jurisdiction to
consider, as parties have the option of applying for general permits,
and are therefore not proscribed from engaging in the discharge of
pollutants.
FACTS: This case concerns the administration of the Clean Water
Act (CWA). While the CWA prevents parties from discharging
pollutants into the nation's waters, the act allows the Army Corps of
Engineers (Corps) to issue general and individual permits. These
permits authorize groups to discharge pollutants and is intended to
allow projects which have a minimal effect on the environment to
proceed efficiently. The CWA allows the Corps to issue general
permits for any category of activities that are similar in nature and
cause minimal environmental effect when performed separately or
cumulatively. Activities that fulfill the conditions for general permits
may be performed without the case-by-case determination required
when obtaining individual permits. A party that discharges pollutants
without, either meeting the conditions of a general permit or
obtaining an individual permit, may be subject to enforcement by the
Corps or the Department of Justice.
The Corps has issued various nationwide permits (NWP) since
the inception of the CWA, the most prominent of which is "NWP
26." In 1996, the Corps proposed the reissue of several NWPs,
including NWP 26, which were set to expire within the year. After
extension of the permit and two comment periods, the Corps replaced
NWPs with a series of replacement permits. The new permits greatly
restricted the scope of qualifying activities, minimizing the allowable
impact, and requiring less of an impact before notification procedures
must be followed. Several parties, including the National
Association of Home Builders (NAHB), filed suit; these actions were
later consolidated.
ANALYSIS: The district court, agreeing with the Corps, concluded
that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the issuance
of an NWP is not a final agency action. The court laid out the
requirements for finality, noting that there must be a definitive
declaration of agency policy, as well as legal consequences, inherent
in the decision. While the court admitted that there was a clear
expression of policy by the Corps, it disagreed with the notion that
parties whose activities are no longer included within an NWP are
subject to final legal consequences. The general permit system does
not deny parties the right to obtain permits, but merely streamlines
the permitting process by limiting the number of individual decisions
that the agency must make. Therefore, parties have not been
subjected to a final decision if they cannot operate under a general
permit, as the option of obtaining an individual permit continues to
exist. Moreover, the delay and cost incurred in applying for an
individual permit are not sufficient to make the agency's decision a
final agency action. For the action to be final, an agency must
explicitly prohibit a party from engaging in a given activity, either by
denying the party an individual permit or by commencing an
enforcement action.
HOLDING: The court granted summary judgment in favor of the
government.
IMPACT: Affected polluters may not challenge the Corps'
regulations until they fail to acquire an individual permit or are
subjected to discipline.
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ARIZONA STATE COURT
Winters v. Ariz. Bd. of Educ., 83 P.3d 1114 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
LAW: A nexus must be shown between a teacher's actions and his
fitness to teach before disciplinary action may be taken on the basis
of the teacher's behavior. This nexus may be shown when off-
campus conduct relates to a teacher's fitness to practice and
adversely affects the school community.
FACTS: The Arizona Board of Education (Board) initiated
disciplinary proceedings against Claude Winters' teaching certificate
on the basis of five separate incidents. Winters' behavior in these
incidents included disorderly conduct, discharge of a firearm,
threatening a former student, and threatening neighbors' children.
Although three of the incidents were not prosecuted, Winters pled
guilty to the unlawful discharge of a firearm and aggravated
harassment. Winters received a hearing before the Professional
Practices Advisory Committee (PPAC), which recommended that
Winters' certificate be revoked. The Board adopted the PPAC's
recommendation, and the trial court affirmed the Board's decision.
ANALYSIS: The trial court is limited to determining whether the
agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence and not
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. In examining the
record, the court disagreed with Winters' allegation that neither the
PPAC nor the Board made a finding that he had engaged in
unprofessional conduct, as the record showed that the hearing
officers considered Winters to have acted unprofessionally.
Winters criticized the Board for failing to define "immoral or
unprofessional conduct," but, as he failed to raise the argument
previously, he was limited to the argument that there is no nexus
between his conduct and the finding that he was unfit to teach.
Winters claimed that there was no evidence that his behavior, which
took place off-campus, affected the operation of the school or harmed
his relationship with students. As the finding of a nexus is a
conclusion of law, the court was able to make an independent
judgment as to whether the underlying factual findings provided a
basis for a finding of unprofessional conduct.
The court declined to limit "unprofessional conduct" to direct
interactions between teachers and students, but the off-campus
conduct must relate to a teacher's fitness to practice and have an
adverse effect on the school. Winters' conduct, which he fully
admitted to, related to his fitness, as the incidents suggested a pattern
of violent behavior which involved children and young adults.
Moreover, the Board is not required to demonstrate the effect of a
teacher's conduct on students, as conduct such as Winters' gives rise
to reasonable inferences of unfitness. As this nexus was implicit in
the Board's findings, the court upheld the Board's decision.
HOLDING: The Board's judgment to revoke Winters' certificate is
affirmed.
IMPACT: Agencies are required to show, or at least imply in the
record, a nexus between a licensee's actions and fitness to practice.
CALIFORNIA STATE COURT
Lockyer v. City of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459 (Cal. 2004).
LAW: Local executive officials do not have the authority to refuse
to enforce a statute because of a belief that it violates the Constitution
unless there has been a judicial determination that the statute is
unconstitutional.
FACTS: In February 2004, Gavin Newsom, the Mayor of San
Francisco, asked his county clerk to revise applications for marriage
licenses in order to eliminate discrimination on the basis of gender or
sexual orientation. Newsom expressed his belief that such
discrimination was prohibited by the California Constitution, and that
his request was made pursuant to his duty to uphold the constitution.
The clerk altered the forms and began issuing marriage licenses to
same-sex couples.
Actions seeking to halt the issuance of same-sex marriage
licenses were filed soon after the city began to perform marriages of
gay and lesbian couples. Eventually, the Attorney General filed a
petition for a writ of mandate, claiming that the city officials' actions
were unlawful and threatened the stable administration of the laws.
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ANALYSIS: The court noted that marriage is largely controlled by
the state legislature, and that the legislature has enacted
comprehensive marriage regulations. Mayors and other city officials
may be given authority to "supervise and control" the actions of a
county clerk, but they do not have the authority to expand a clerk's
authority to grant marriage licenses. Moreover, local executive
officials do not have the authority to refuse to enforce an allegedly
unconstitutional statute unless there has been a judicial determination
of its unconstitutionality.
Noting that the constitutionality of a statute is presumed, the
court also cited case history to demonstrate the proposition that local
officials are unable to declare a statute unconstitutional. In addition,
the court rejected the notion that a declaration of unconstitutionality
might be a valid means of allowing the case to come before the court,
as the city has the option of persuading affected parties to challenge
the statutes in court. Thus, local officials did not possess the
authority to neglect their ministerial duties because of a belief that a
governing statute is unconstitutional.
The court also indicated that allowing officials to ignore laws that
they consider unconstitutional would create adverse consequences.
Local officials are unlikely to have the legal training to make delicate
constitutional decisions. Additionally, the personal determination
made by an executive would be made without the due process
protections afforded when constitutional questions are heard in court.
Such a situation would also cause laws to be haphazardly applied, as
multitudes of officials could refuse to enforce laws based on their
diverse interpretations of the constitution.
Because the mayor and city officials did not possess the authority
to perform same-sex marriages, the marriages were to be considered
void. As the court is addressing a legal question which can be
broadly applied, the court will not need to invalidate the marriages on
an individual basis. Moreover, the couples' due process rights are
not violated, as the couples have been given the opportunity to
participate in the relevant proceedings. Finally, the court declined to
maintain the status of the marriages until a substantive constitutional
decision is reached, as these marriages are considered to have been
void from the beginning. Also, allowing the validity of the marriages
to remain uncertain could create further reliance on the part of same-
sex couples, leaving the potential for irreparable harm.
HOLDING: The Attorney General's petition for mandamus is
granted.
IMPACT: The same-sex marriages performed in San Francisco are
void, as the officials had no authority to grant couples marriage
licenses to gay and lesbian couples.
Ouintero v. City of Santa Ana, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 896 (Ct. App. 2003).
LAW: An individual may be deprived of procedural due process in
an administrative hearing if there is an appearance of unfairness,
even if there is no showing of actual bias.
FACTS: Quintero's discharge was upheld by the Santa Ana
Personnel Board (Board). Subsequently, Quintero filed a petition for
writ of mandate, as Halford, the attorney prosecuting his case, had
previously acted as the Board's representative, thereby denying him
the right to a fair hearing.
ANALYSIS: Procedural due process entails a hearing before an
impartial and uninvolved decision-maker. If actual bias is not
present, a party claiming a procedural due process violation must
demonstrate that, in light of the facts, the probability of actual bias is
intolerably high. While there must be more than a "unilateral
perception of bias," due process demands an appearance of fairness.
Although Halford had not performed dual roles in Quintero's case,
his interactions with the Board increased the likelihood that his
presence as an advocate would unduly influence the Board in its
decision-making process. The possibility that Board members might
look to Halford, the prosecutor, for guidance created the appearance
of bias.
While dual representation may be appropriate, there needs to be
enough separation between the attorneys and their roles, and an
inquiry into the probability of actual bias will be determined by the
totality of the circumstances in a given case.
HOLDING: The lower court's judgment is reversed, and the case is
remanded.
IMPACT: A violation of procedural due process may be found even
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if an attorney is not performing advisory and prosecutorial roles in
the same case. If the attorney's dual roles create a likelihood that the
hearing will appear unfair, due process may be violated.
ILLINOIS STATE COURT
Emerald Casino, Inc. v. Ill. Gaming Bd., 803 N.E.2d 914 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2003).
LAW: The use of "shall" in a statute, which only applied to one
particular licensee, was mandatory, and required the Illinois Gaming
Board (Board) to grant the licensee's application for renewal and
relocation.
FACTS: The Illinois Gaming Board is authorized to issue ten
riverboat gambling licenses, including four Mississippi River
licenses, under the state's Riverboat Gambling Act. Emerald Casino
was given one of the Mississippi River licenses in 1992. When the
casino wished to relocate to Rosemont in 1997, the Board refused the
application, and an administrative law judge agreed with the Board's
denial.
After the decision, the legislature amended the Act, incorporating
a section which allowed a licensee to apply for renewal and approval
of relocation, indicating that the Board "shall" grant the licensee's
application if the new home municipality agrees. This legislation
seemed to apply exclusively to Emerald. Emerald submitted a
second application, but the Board denied the application and issued a
disciplinary complaint against Emerald's license. Emerald filed a
complaint in the circuit court; the court granted the Board summary
judgment.
ANALYSIS: The court rejected the Board's argument that the case
is not yet ripe because the rationale behind the ripeness doctrine is
not present, as the issue of legislative intent is clearly defined rather
than abstract. Additionally, the court concluded that Emerald was
not required to exhaust administrative remedies, as the case fit within
established exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine. The relevant
issues, which relate to statutory interpretation, fit within the expertise
of the courts and not the Board. Likewise, the scope of an agency's
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power is a question to be determined by judges, not agencies.
Finally, the lengthy administrative procedures could cause irreparable
harm to Emerald. Thus, declaratory judgment was a fitting remedy
in this case, particularly because it raised concerns relating to
statutory construction.
The court found the word "shall" to be mandatory in this case.
"Shall" typically indicates that an action is mandatory, but the
meaning must be considered in light of the legislation as a whole, as
well as the intent of the legislature. Judges have interpreted "shall"
as mandatory where the statute is not directed at technicalities and
where it protects a right or benefit. The word has also been
interpreted as directory in cases where a mandatory interpretation
would frustrate the purpose of the statute or violate the principle of
the separation of powers. A mandatory reading of "shall" permits a
construction that is in accordance with the intention behind the
amendment. Significantly, the legislature was aware that the statute
would only apply to Emerald, and must have created the legislation
with the intent of allowing Emerald to relocate. A directory reading
of "shall" would be unlikely to accomplish the legislature's intent,
given the Board's animosity towards Emerald.
Finally, the court dismissed the Board's contention that
construing "shall" to be mandatory would undermine the Board's
legitimate duties to protect the public. The Board may still initiate
disciplinary proceedings, and the legislative record indicates that the
amendments were not intended to divest the Board of the authority to
revoke gaming licenses.
HOLDING: The circuit court's orders are reversed, and the matter
is remanded.
IMPACT: The Board must allow Emerald Casino to relocate to
Rosemont.
MARYLAND STATE COURT
Spencer v. Md. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 846 A.2d 341 (Md. 2004).
LAW: While the Maryland State Board of Pharmacy (Board) denied
a licensee due process by refusing to recuse panel members who
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represented the Board at an earlier point in the litigation process, the
Board did not abuse its discretion by refusing to refer the case to the
Office of Administrative Hearings.
FACTS: Linda Spencer, a pharmacist, was charged by the Maryland
State Board of Pharmacy for practicing with an expired license. The
Board attempted to resolve the matter in a conference, which was
ultimately unsuccessful. At the conference, Stanton Ades and Laura
Schneider represented the Board. Ades and Schneider later sat on the
Board's panel to hear Spencer's case. Spencer made a motion for the
matter to be referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
or to recuse Board members from the proceedings, but these motions
were denied by the Board. The Board ultimately placed Spencer on
probation, imposed a fine, and reprimanded her.
Spencer alleged a deprivation of procedural due process before
the circuit court, which vacated the Board's order. The court of
special appeals remanded the case to the circuit court, instructing the
court to remand the case to the Board and direct the Board to hear the
case before the OAH.
ANALYSIS: The court distinguished between the Board's failure to
recuse its panel members and its failure to refer the case to the OAH.
Although Spencer had been denied due process when she was not
allowed to be heard before an impartial decision-maker, this harm did
not imply that Spencer's case could only be heard before the OAH.
The decision to refer a case to the OAH is left to the discretion of the
Board, and the Board could have provided Spencer with sufficient
due process by recusing Ades and Schneider. Moreover, it was not
arbitrary or capricious for the Board to forego the OAH.
Spencer's argument that a remand will create res judicata or
double jeopardy issues is rejected by the court. As the Board acts to
protect the public rather than punish, it is not subject to doublejeopardy. Moreover, res judicata is not applicable, as a final decision
has not been reached.
HOLDING: The judgment of the court of special appeals is reversed
in part, and the case is remanded with directions.
IMPACT: The Board must provide a more impartial hearing for
Spencer, but she is not entitled to a hearing before an Administrative
Law Judge.
NEBRASKA STATE COURT
Lariat Club, Inc. v. Neb. Liquor Control Comm'n, 673 N.W.2d
29 (Neb. 2004).
LAW: A show cause order which failed to advise a licensee that
character and reputation would be considered in a revocation
proceeding denied due process to the licensee.
FACTS: After Calburt Sheets, owner of the Lariat Club bar, had
been stopped and arrested, the Liquor Control Commission issued a
show cause order, which required the Lariat Club to show cause as to
whether or not the license should be suspended. The order
mentioned Sheets' outstanding warrant, previous DWI conviction,
possession of marijuana, and conviction for driving with a suspended
license. No mention of Sheets' personal character was made. The
Commission held a hearing on the show cause order and ultimately
decided to cancel the Lariat Club's liquor license. The Commission
ordered the cancellation of the license based solely on Calburt
Sheets' character and reputation.
ANALYSIS: Due process requires, at a minimum, notice and the
opportunity for a hearing. Because the Lariat Club was not advised
that Sheet's character and reputation would be considered, it was
denied the opportunity to prepare and produce evidence relating to
the issue of Sheets' character. Therefore, the Lariat Club was given
inadequate notice and was denied due process.
HOLDING: The district court's affirmation of the Commission's
decision is reversed, and the case is remanded to the district court
with instructions to remand the case to the Commission.
IMPACT: The Lariat Club must be given another hearing in which it
will be given the opportunity to produce evidence relevant to Sheets'
character.
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NEW JERSEY STATE COURT
In re Red Bank Charter Sch., 843 A.2d 365 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2004).
LAW: The Commissioner's decision to renew a charter school was
quasi-legislative, and an adjudicatory hearing on the decision was not
necessary. Moreover, this decision was not arbitrary or capricious,
and was therefore proper. The Commissioner, however, must hold
adjudicatory hearings to consider whether the school's practices
exacerbate the district's existing racial imbalance.
FACTS: In October 2001, the Red Bank Charter School applied to
the Commissioner of Education for the renewal of its charter and
expansion of the school to incorporate a larger number of students.
The Commissioner, acting under the Charter School Program Act of
1995, has the authority to grant a renewal, but is required to conduct
a "comprehensive review" of the charter school, including a
"structured interview" and visit to the school.
That November, the Red Bank Board of Education filed
opposition to the application, arguing that the Charter School had
increased segregation and requesting a hearing to assess the school's
effect on segregation. As part of its review process, the Department
of Education asked the Charter School to reply to the Board's
objections. The Charter School responded by saying that the factors
influencing segregation were outside the school's control and existed
before the creation of the Charter School; the decline in the number
of white children in Board-controlled schools was due to the growth
of private and parochial schools as well as the home schooling
movement. The Board objected and asked for permission to respond,
but the Commissioner did not appear to acknowledge the Board's
request.
After his review, the Commissioner renewed the charter and
allowed the Charter School to expand. The Commissioner's renewal
did not make any mention of possible segregation or the Board's
challenge to the school. The Board made an administrative appeal to
the State Board of Education, which affirmed the Commissioner's
decision, stating that the Board had not made a demonstration that the
Charter School had a segregative effect or that it would
impermissibly impact the racial composition of schools in the area.
The Board appealed this decision to the court.
ANALYSIS: The court rejected the Board's claim that the
Commissioner breached his duty to investigate the Charter School's
potential segregative effect. The Commissioner must ensure that the
continued operation of a charter school does not result in segregation.
While there is a racial imbalance between the Charter School and
other schools in the district, the imbalance could conceivably stem
from other factors.
An adjudicatory hearing is not required in this context. In
examining the charter, the Commissioner is not acting in an
adjudicatory capacity; furthermore, the statutes do not require
hearings in charter application and renewal proceedings. The
Commissioner is not required to provide a statement of reasoning
unless the charter is denied. The renewal decision, being quasi-
legislative, implicates a more relaxed standard of review than an
adjudicative determination. The court must determine whether a
decision is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; the reasons
upholding the decision must be discernable from the record, but do
not need to be formally stated. Although the Commissioner did not
discuss segregation concerns in his approval letter, the record
provided enough evidence supporting the contention that the Charter
School did not foster segregation. Therefore, the decision to renew
the charter was not arbitrary or capricious.
However, the court expressed concern with the enrollment
statistics, which indicate that the Charter School educates a highly
disproportionate number of white students compared to district
schools. While the court rejected the Board's desired remedy of
closing an otherwise satisfactory charter school, it encouraged the
Board to bring actions challenging practices of the Charter School,
such as the sibling preference policy and the withdrawal policy,
which appear to increase the school's racial imbalance. Furthermore,
the court criticized the Commissioner for failing to address
exacerbation concerns in a later hearing, and directed him to conduct
a hearing to determine whether the Charter School has exacerbated
segregation and to fashion an appropriate remedy.
HOLDING: The State Board's decision to renew and expand the
charter is affirmed. The court remands issues relating to the school's
adverse effect on racial imbalance to the State Board, allowing the
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Commissioner to conduct a hearing and develop a remedy if
necessary.
IMPACT: The Charter School is allowed to keep its charter,
however, the Commissioner must conduct an adjudicatory hearing on
the issue of whether the schools practices exacerbate existing
segregation.
TEXAS STATE COURT
Willmann v. City of San Antonio, 123 S.W.3d 469 (Tex. Ct. App.
2003).
LAW: An advisory committee may violate the Texas Open
Meetings Act if the committee functions as a decision-maker on a
practical level, with actual decision-makers "rubber stamping" the
committee's proposals.
FACTS: In 1997, the San Antonio City Council appointed five of its
members to the Municipal Court Committee (Committee), which
reviewed and discussed applicants for appointment, and
reappointment, as municipal court judges. However, Committee
meetings did not comply with the notice and recording requirements
of the Texas Open Meetings Act (TOMA). Eventually, the
Committee gave its recommendations to the Mayor and City Council
and asked the Council to concur with its selection at an open
meeting. Before the meeting, the Committee chair informed the non-
recommended judges that they had not been recommended for
reappointment and thanked them for their service. The draft
ordinance presented in the City Council meeting contained the names
of those individuals who had been recommended for reappointment.
In addition, discussion of the candidates was limited, as only three
individuals were discussed in depth.
The non-recommended judges sued the City. They claimed that
the ordinance violated the Texas Constitution, which did not allow
officers to be removed from office until successors had been
appointed and qualified. Additionally, the judges claimed that the
decision-making process violated TOMA, as the City Council's
action was merely a "rubber stamp" approval of conclusions
previously arrived at during the Committee's meetings. The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, claiming that
there was no evidence supporting a violation of TOMA and that the
ordinance did not violate the Texas Constitution.
ANALYSIS: The question of whether the TOMA applied in these
specific circumstances was a matter of first impression for the court,
which looked to the Attorney General opinions and relevant Texas
case law in arriving at its conclusion. The court refuted the notion
that there can never be a "meeting" unless there is a quorum, as
TOMA is to be broadly construed and the government cannot
circumvent its requirements by purposely avoiding a quorum.
Moreover, while the Committee is an "advisory committee" in form,
there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
Committee's practical authority extended beyond its advisory
function. If the evidence suggests that the City Council "rubber
stamped" decisions predetermined by the Committee in closed
meetings, TOMA may have been violated. Thus, the trial court erred
in granting summary judgment to the City.
However, the Texas Constitution was held to be inapplicable to
the situation at hand. The provision requiring a duly qualified
successor was not intended to grant a personal right to an officer, but
was enacted to prevent a vacancy which might inconvenience the
public. Because the number of judges remained static despite the
lack of successors, the provision does not apply.
HOLDING: The trial court's judgment on the judges' TOMA claim
is reversed and remanded.
IMPACT: The affected judges are given an opportunity to go to trial
and demonstrate that the Commission's actions violated TOMA.
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